| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Snipe-IT is an IT asset/license management system. Prior to 8.6.1, POST /two-factor has no rate limiting, lockout, or attempt counter, allowing an attacker with valid credentials to submit unlimited TOTP guesses against the three accepted codes created by config/google2fa.php window=1. A successful guess creates a fully authenticated session. When two_factor_enabled is 1, POST /account/profile with two_factor_optin=0 can disable two-factor authentication without OTP reverification, while required mode 2 prevents that opt-out. An administrator can also use POST /api/v1/users/two_factor_reset to clear another user's secret. This issue is fixed in version 8.6.1. |
| Snipe-IT is an IT asset/license management system. Prior to 8.6.1, a user with the import permission can use CSV update mode to overwrite the email address of a non-admin user and then request a password reset to take over that account. app/Importer/UserImporter.php applies the canEditAuthFields gate by unsetting username, email, password, and activated on the model, but app/Importer/ItemImporter.php sanitizeItemForUpdating() rebuilds the update array from the raw CSV row in $this->item, restoring the unauthorized values. The app/Http/Controllers/ImportController.php import path checks import permission but does not require users.edit. This issue is fixed in version 8.6.1. |
| Snipe-IT is an IT asset/license management system. Prior to 8.5.0, a user who can edit other users can reset a superadmin's two-factor authentication through app/Http/Controllers/Api/UsersController.php postTwoFactorReset(). The endpoint authorizes update access but does not enforce canEditAuthFields before clearing two_factor_secret and two_factor_enrolled. This issue is fixed in version 8.5.0. |
| Snipe-IT is an IT asset/license management system. Prior to 8.4.1, a non-superadmin can use app/Http/Controllers/Assets/BulkAssetsController.php update() to submit company_id directly without Company::getIdForCurrentUser(), allowing assets to be moved across company boundaries and breaking multi-tenant isolation. This issue is fixed in version 8.4.1. |
| Snipe-IT is an IT asset/license management system. Prior to 8.6.0, an authenticated user with users.create permission can submit the admin permission while creating a user because store() in app/Http/Controllers/Users/UsersController.php strips superuser permission but does not strip admin permission. The created account can obtain administrative privileges. This issue is fixed in version 8.6.0. |
| Snipe-IT is an IT asset/license management system. Prior to 8.4.1, an authenticated user with generic asset edit permission can delete files attached to assets outside the user's ownership or company assignment. The destroy() methods in app/Http/Controllers/Api/UploadedFilesController.php and app/Http/Controllers/UploadedFilesController.php authorize update against the object class instead of the resolved object instance, creating an insecure direct object reference. This issue is fixed in version 8.4.1. |
| Snipe-IT is an IT asset/license management system. Prior to 8.6.3, a company-scoped user in FMCS floater mode can access users whose company_id is null because broad API queries and bulk web actions do not consistently apply isCurrentUserHasAccess. The /api/v1/users and /api/v1/users/{id}/licenses endpoints can expose personal data and assigned licenses, /users/bulkeditsave can modify out-of-scope profiles, and /users/merge can soft-delete users and transfer assigned assets. This issue is fixed in version 8.6.3. |
| Snipe-IT is an IT asset/license management system. Prior to 8.6.3, a restricted user can request /api/v1/users/{target_id}/eulas to obtain another user's randomized EULA filename and then download the signed file through /account/stored-eula-file/{filename}. The primary /stored-eula-file/{filename} route correctly denies access, but app/Http/Controllers/ProfileController.php and app/Http/Controllers/Api/UsersController.php do not consistently enforce ownership and target-user authorization. This issue is fixed in version 8.6.3. |
| Snipe-IT is an IT asset/license management system. Prior to 8.6.3, any activated account can request /maintenances/{id} and read maintenance records for assets in the same company without asset or maintenance permission. app/Http/Controllers/MaintenancesController.php show() renders the record without authorize(), while company-scoped route-model binding only prevents access to other companies. Disclosed fields include asset tags, suppliers, purchase costs, notes, and dates. This issue is fixed in version 8.6.3. |
| Snipe-IT is an IT asset/license management system. Prior to 8.6.2, a stored manufacturer or supplier name passed as the table component $name becomes data-selected-count-id in resources/views/partials/bootstrap-table.blade.php. Client-side code reads the browser-decoded countId, uses it as a selector, concatenates countId.substring(1) into an HTML string, and passes the string to jQuery .after(). A crafted name can therefore execute JavaScript when an authenticated user views the manufacturer detail page or supplier detail page, potentially exposing data or actions available to that session. This issue is fixed in version 8.6.2. |
| Snipe-IT is an IT asset/license management system. Prior to 8.7.0, a password-authenticated session for an account with self.api permission can reach the personal-access-token API flow before completing the account's second-factor challenge because CheckForTwoFactor is enforced in the web middleware group but not the API middleware group. The advisory states that the resulting persistent API token can read and modify resources with the victim's permissions and, for an administrator, can reach the users/two_factor_reset endpoint. Resetting the administrator's enrolled second factor allows the password-holding attacker to enroll an attacker-controlled factor, take over the administrator's web account, and lock out the legitimate user. The token does not create a web session, but it provides broad API access while the same browser session remains blocked at the two-factor page. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.7.0. |
| Snipe-IT is an IT asset/license management system. Prior to 8.7.0, the uploaded-files API endpoint GET /api/v1/{object_type}/{id}/files/{file_id} allows an authenticated user with file-management access to upload XML and XSLT attachments and request them with the inline=true parameter. The app/Http/Controllers/Api/UploadedFilesController.php show() path does not apply the safe-inline allowlist used by the equivalent web controller, so the browser can process an attacker-controlled xml-stylesheet reference and execute JavaScript generated by the stylesheet in the Snipe-IT origin. A victim who is authorized to view the object must open the attachment URL, after which the script can read same-origin data and perform authenticated actions with the victim's privileges. This issue is fixed in version 8.7.0. |
| Snipe-IT is an IT asset/license management system. Prior to 8.7.0, a user with the customfields.create permission can store markup in CustomField.name, and app/Presenters/AssetPresenter.php assigns that value as an unescaped bootstrap-table header title. When another user opens an asset-list page associated with the fieldset, the stored markup executes on page load in that user's Snipe-IT session. This can expose same-origin data and perform authenticated actions with the victim's privileges, including privilege escalation when a superuser views the affected list. This issue is fixed in version 8.7.0. |
| Snipe-IT through 8.6.4 (fixed in 8.7.0) does not enforce the components.view permission on the authenticated endpoint GET /api/v1/hardware/<asset-id>/assigned/components. The endpoint authorizes only assets.view on the parent asset before returning linked component details; the components.view check is applied only to the response's available_actions.view flag and not to the returned data. As a result, an authenticated user holding only assets.view can enumerate component IDs, names, assigned quantities, and notes that are otherwise protected — the direct GET /api/v1/components/<id> endpoint correctly returns 403 Forbidden for such users. |
| Snipe-IT versions before 8.7.0 fail to authorize the POST /hardware/history endpoint, allowing any authenticated user to reassign arbitrary assets and modify audit logs. Attackers can submit a CSV file to reassign assets across companies and inject fraudulent audit trail entries, compromising inventory integrity and accountability. |
| Snipe-IT before 8.7.0 fails to properly gate Laravel Passport's OAuth client management routes, allowing any authenticated user to register OAuth clients with attacker-controlled redirect URIs. Attackers can trick administrators into approving consent screens, then exchange authorization codes for bearer tokens inheriting full admin API permissions lasting up to 40 years. |
| Snipe-IT 8.6.3 and earlier do not check the return value of Storage::put() when writing the signature PNG and the generated acceptance PDF in Account\AcceptanceController::store(). On filesystem drivers that return false instead of throwing on a write failure (for example the local disk with restrictive permissions, S3 with expired credentials, or a storage backend that is out of quota), execution continues into $acceptance->accept(), which sets accepted_at and the signature_filename/eula_filename fields, creates the 'accepted' action-log entry, and dispatches completion notifications even though the evidence files were never stored. The result is an acceptance record marked complete whose supporting evidence files do not exist, yielding a materially incomplete compliance artifact for EULA acknowledgement or equipment-receipt workflows. The condition is triggered when an authenticated user completes an acceptance while the storage backend is silently failing writes; an attacker cannot directly force the storage backend into that state. Fixed in Snipe-IT 8.7.0. |
| Snipe-IT is an IT asset management application. In Snipe-IT master-branch builds after 8.6.3 (the code was never included in a tagged release), SettingsController::downloadLocationScopingReport streams the FMCS location-scoping mismatch report (GET /admin/settings/location-scoping-report.csv) through a bare fputcsv() call without applying League\Csv\EscapeFormula, unlike the other CSV exports which honor config('app.escape_formulas'). An authenticated user with ordinary create/edit rights can place a spreadsheet formula in free-text fields that appear in the report (item name, asset tag, serial, item or location company name, location name) and arrange for the record to be FMCS-mismatched so it is included in the export. When a superuser downloads the report and opens it in Excel, LibreOffice Calc, or Google Sheets with formula evaluation enabled and external-content warnings dismissed or disabled, cells beginning with =, +, -, @, tab, or CR are executed in the victim's spreadsheet context, enabling data exfiltration (e.g., HYPERLINK/WEBSERVICE) or, on Windows Excel, legacy DDE command execution. This issue is fixed in version 8.7.0. |
| Snipe-IT versions 8.2.0 through 8.6.x (fixed in 8.7.0) contain an incorrect authorization flaw in app/Http/Controllers/Users/UsersController::update(). The single-user edit route assigned the activated field from the request payload before evaluating the canEditAuthFields authorization gate, so an authenticated non-admin user holding the users.edit permission in the target's company scope can submit a full valid PUT request to /users/{id} and toggle the activated flag on any user, including admin and superuser accounts. Deactivating an admin locks that account out of the application until another admin or superuser re-enables it. Only the activated field is affected; username, email, password and permissions remain protected by the gate, no data is disclosed, and the API (Api\UsersController::update) and bulk-edit paths are not affected. |
| Snipe-IT versions 4.2.0 through 8.6.3 expose Laravel Passport's auto-registered personal-access-token routes (GET, POST, DELETE /oauth/personal-access-tokens*) with only 'web' and 'auth:web' middleware, without the self.api permission gate that Snipe-IT enforces on its own token endpoints (/account/api and /api/v1/account/personal-access-tokens). Any user with a valid web session and the corresponding CSRF token can POST to /oauth/personal-access-tokens and mint a long-lived bearer token for their own account, even when an administrator has denied the self.api permission. The issued token is still subject to existing per-endpoint authorization policies, so this is not a privilege escalation; it defeats the administrative control intended to block API/scripted access at the user's own permission level. Fixed in 8.7.0 (commit 3f74b8c), which registers overriding routes wrapped in the can:self.api middleware. |
